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NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY 
William W. Berry III* 
When the Court interprets the Constitution to accord a new right to criminal offenders, the 
question quickly becomes which prisoners might benefit from the new rule.  The current retroactivity 
doctrine relies on a confusing substance-procedure dichotomy.  Drawn from Teague v. Lane, this 
test often results in lower court splits on the retroactivity question.  Recently, the Supreme Court 
decided the question of retroactivity in two cases—Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v. 
United States. 
 This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a competing theoretical frame for 
considering the question of retroactivity.  Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative 
retroactivity,” arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of the new 
rule on previous guilt and sentencing determinations.  Further, the article advances a doctrinal 
test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of criminal constitutional law that combines 
the normative impact of the rule with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of 
fundamental fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality, comity, 
and government financial burden. 
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The way to right wrongs is to shine the light of truth upon them. 
 
—Ida R. Wells-Barnett 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution to recognize a new 
right for criminal defendants, the outcome seems to be a cause for 
celebration for prisoners.  The real question, though, is whether the 
decision applies retroactively to those convicted and sentenced in the 
manner now determined to be unconstitutional.1 
The Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida in January 2016 provides a recent 
example of this kind of inquiry.2  In Hurst, the Court held that Florida’s 
capital sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment.3  By allowing the 
judge to determine whether the State had proved the aggravating facts 
required to impose the death penalty, Florida’s law violated Hurst’s right to 
 
 1 Although initially the subject of skepticism concerning the ability and propriety of judges 
to ‘make law,’ the retroactivity doctrine has been developed by the Court over the past 
several decades.  See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69 (explaining that a 
court’s duty is not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one”).  
But see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (marking the first in a line of cases 
moving away from the court’s non-retroactivity doctrine). 
 2 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 3 Id.  Florida currently has 396 prisoners on death row, the second largest death row in the 
United States behind California.  Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
(July 1, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-
row-year. 
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a trial by jury.4  While Hurst no longer faces execution, it is not clear 
whether the new constitutional rule will apply to others sentenced under the 
same unconstitutional process.5  In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that its death penalty was unconstitutional because it granted judges, 
not juries, the ultimate decision-making power in capital cases, following the 
holding in Hurst.6 
The Court applied the retroactivity doctrine in two cases in the October 
2015 term, Montgomery v. Louisiana and Welch v. United States.7  In Montgomery, 
the Court held that its prior decision in Miller v. Alabama applied 
retroactively.8  Miller held in 2012 that mandatory juvenile life-without-parole 
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishments.9  The initial response of the states to the question of 
whether Miller applied retroactively was inconsistent, leading to a split 
among lower courts.10 
In Welch v. United States, the Court similarly held its decision in Johnson v. 
United States applied retroactively.11  Johnson held that the Armed Career 
Criminals Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony” was 
 
 4 136 S. Ct. at 622.  See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2000) 
(establishing the Sixth Amendment rule with respect to statutory maximums); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (applying the Apprendi rule to capital cases). 
 5 It appears that the decision in Hurst might apply retroactively, at least to cases in Florida.  
The Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on the question, but it did stay an execution 
scheduled for February 2, 2016.  Mark Berman,  Florida Supreme Court Halts Scheduled 
Execution After Debate Over State’s Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/02/02/florida-supreme-court-halts-
scheduled-execution-after-debate-over-states-death-penalty/.  Interestingly, the Hurst 
decision did not stop Alabama, which has a similar system to Florida, from continuing to 
execute offenders.  Alabama executed Christopher Brooks on January 21, 2016, nine days 
after the Court decided Hurst.  The Court denied Brooks’s petition for a stay and writ of 
certiorari.  See Brooks v. Alabama, 136 S.Ct. 708 (2016) (denying petition for stay and writ 
of certiorari to consider whether Hurst v. Florida applies to Alabama’s capital sentencing 
scheme).  Justice Stephen Breyer dissented and called more broadly for a re-examination 
of the constitutionality of the death penalty.  Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The unfairness 
inherent in treating this case differently from others which used similarly 
unconstitutional procedures only underscores the need to reconsider the validity of 
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 6 State v. Rauf, No. 1509009858, 2016 WL 320094 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2016). 
 7 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 
(2016).  
 8 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; see generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) 
(holding that the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 9 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 10 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 
 11 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). 
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unconstitutionally vague.12  Again, the question was whether, having received 
an unconstitutional sentence, prisoners have a right to resentencing 
through a retroactive application of the Court’s decision.13 
It is not enough, then, for the Supreme Court to hold that a particular 
kind of criminal sentence or sentencing procedure is unconstitutional.14  
Rather, the question remains whether that decision applies to those already 
serving such sentences—a retroactive application—or simply prohibits the 
prospective imposition of such sentences in the future.15 
At face value, it is a travesty that offenders can remain in prison or even 
be executed in cases where, if decided today, the imposition of that sentence 
would violate their constitutional rights.16  This seems offensive both as a 
matter of individual rights and as a matter of equal treatment under the 
law.17 
And yet, the Court’s cases have generally disfavored the retroactive 
application of constitutional decisions to criminal cases on collateral 
 
 12 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).  Specifically, the Court struck 
down the residual clause of the definition of violent felony, which defined it to include a 
crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”  Id.  Without the “violent felony” enhancement, the statutory 
maximum sentence is ten years, but with the enhancement, the statutory minimum is 
fifteen years.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2015). 
 13 There were strong arguments that Johnson should apply retroactively under the Court’s 
doctrine.  See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications Of Johnson’s 
Potential Ruling On ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 60–63, 65–73 
(2015) (discussing the potential effects of a Supreme Court ruling on Johnson following 
certiorari but prior to oral argument); Leah M. Litman, Resentencing In The Shadow of 
Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SEN’G REP. 45, 47–49 (2015) (summarizing briefly the 
Johnson ruling’s potential retroactive applications). 
 14 In theory, the Roman law principle of ubi jus ibi remedium (“where there is a right, there is 
a remedy”) should control.  See Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (U.K.) 
(“[E]very man that is injured ought to have his recompense.”).  From the Court’s 
perspective, however, other values like finality and comity sometimes trump the 
constitutional rights of inmates who have completed their direct appeals.  See infra, Part 
I.A.; see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing for narrowing the application of new 
constitutional rules to prisoners raising collateral challenges in habeas corpus). 
 15 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. 
REV.  1059 (1997) (explaining the retroactivity inquiry and framing it as a study of legal 
change). 
 16 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) (addressing the potential 
unfairness of non-retroactivity approaches to new constitutional rules by reframing the 
inquiry in terms of constitutional remedies doctrine); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: 
The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
23 (1991) (exploring the unfairness of Teague in the death penalty context). 
 17 See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (1977) (exploring 
theories of retroactivity, including fairness and equality, before arguing that the concept 
of legal validity should determine the content of “retroactive law”). 
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review.18  Several values compete with notions of fairness and equality under 
the law.  The first concern is that allowing retroactive application of newly 
unearthed interpretations of the Constitution compromises the finality of 
prior criminal proceedings.19  In addition, the cost of reopening cases serves 
as a second deterrent to retroactive application of new constitutional rules.20  
Finally, where the application of such rules would require state governments 
to retry or resentence cases, the value of comity—deference to state courts—
provides another reason to apply decisions prospectively.21 
The applicable rule with respect to retroactivity comes from Teague v. 
Lane.22  In Teague, the Court declined to retroactively apply its holding in 
Batson v. Kentucky,23 even though prosecutors had unconstitutionally used 
 
 18 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295–96 (1989) (affirming a line of cases forbidding 
retroactive action of new precedents on collateral review of criminal convictions); 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622–40 (explaining the Warren Court’s non-
retroactivity doctrine). 
 19 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (“Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to 
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived 
of much of its deterrent effect.”).  See also Bator, supra note 15; Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s 
Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007) (arguing that Court’s 
adoption of concepts of finality misreads the purposes of AEDPA); Andrew Chongseh 
Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of 
Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561 (2013) (arguing that “finality” is not an interest in itself, 
but rather a collection of interests that can actually be harmed by refusing to grant post-
conviction relief). 
 20 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (“In many ways the application of new rules to cases on collateral 
review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, for it 
continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants 
whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards.”); see also 
Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1329 (2000) 
(emphasizing economic costs as an argument against retroactivity). 
 21 Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (“If a defendant fails to comply with state procedural rules and is 
barred from litigating a particular constitutional claim in state court, the claim can be 
considered on federal habeas only if the defendant shows cause for the default and actual 
prejudice resulting therefrom.”); see also Bator, supra note 14; Kovarsky, supra note 19.  
For a compelling argument against the value of comity, see Louise Weinberg, Against 
Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53, 55 (1991) (“Reciprocal comity is not the appealing prescription 
that it sounds, but instead, in implementation, is discriminatory and substantively 
damaging to the rule of law”). 
 22 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).  This rule is complimentary to the broader 
statutory scheme created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).  Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 
(2006)).  Specifically, AEDPA, section 2254(d)(1) limits habeas relief to state criminal 
sentences to cases where the state proceeding “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that 
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. at § 2254(d)(1).  But the AEDPA and 
Teague inquiries are separate.  Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). 
 23 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986). 
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peremptory challenges to systematically eliminate black jurors during jury 
selection.24  Despite the clear injustice, the Court held in Teague that the 
values of finality and comity outweighed the value of fairness to the 
individual defendant.25 
Teague decided that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
generally did not apply retroactively, with two exceptions.26  First, if the rule 
is substantive in nature, in that it places the conduct beyond the power of 
the government to proscribe its limits, the Court applies it retroactively.27  
Second, if the rule is procedural in nature, the Court does not apply it 
retroactively unless it is a “watershed rule” of criminal procedure, “implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty.”28 
Thus, under Teague, constitutional holdings apply retroactively only 
when they are substantive; procedural outcomes generally do not fall under 
the “watershed rule” exception.29  Certainly part of the rationale for this rule 
was the Court’s belief that interests of finality and comity trumped the 
concepts of fundamental fairness and individual rights.30 
Increasingly, the Teague test creates confusion for courts attempting to 
determine retroactivity.31  As explained below, the line between substance 
and procedure becomes blurred in many cases.32  Constitutional rules like 
 
 24 Teague, 489 U.S. at 296. 
 25 Id. at 308.  The decision in Teague sparked a considerable literature with respect to 
retroactivity.  See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A Comment on 
Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453, 2458 (1993) (arguing that “Teague subverts 
congressional intent by achieving finality at the expense of all other values Congress 
meant habeas to safeguard, including fairness and accuracy, even in capital cases”); 
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16 (addressing the potential unfairness of non-retroactivity 
approaches to new constitutional rules); Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great 
Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 BYU L. REV. 183, 210 (favoring 
a statutory approach to non-retroactivity doctrine); Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: 
Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (1994) (criticizing Teague on various 
grounds, including the conceptual difficulties of connecting “newness” and “holdings”); 
Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What the 
Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What It Might, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677, 1699–
1700 (2007) (considering the application of the retroactivity framework to a line of cases 
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). 
 26 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12. 
 27 Id. at 311. 
 28 Id. at 311-12. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. at 308 (citing the “interests of comity and finality”). 
 31 The test’s shortcomings are well-documented.  See, e.g., John Blume & William Pratt, 
Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 326 (1991) (arguing 
that Teague failed to make retroactivity outcomes more predictable); Kermit Rooosevelt 
III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 1075, 1113–15 (1999) (highlighting the difficulties of applying the Teague test). 
 32 See, e.g., 1 CHARLES FREDERIC CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 171 (1911)  (“[T]he distinction between substantive and procedural law is 
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the one in Miller often have both substantive and procedural dimensions.  
Further, the vagueness of the substance-procedure distinction allows lower 
courts to respond to the determination of the Court based on other 
considerations, including the lower court’s affinity (or disaffinity) for the 
new rule, the rule’s effect on the court’s criminal population, the rule’s 
potential impact on the court’s judicial resources, and the court’s level of 
stigmatization of criminal offenders.33 
Also, the Teague test appears disconnected from the competing values in 
this context—fairness and finality.34  The idea that procedural errors should 
receive less scrutiny than substantive errors might be appealing in the 
abstract, but it can lead to absurd results in practice, with respect to 
retroactivity.35 
This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a 
competing theoretical frame for considering the question of retroactivity.  
Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative retroactivity,” 
arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of 
the new rule on guilt and sentencing determinations.  Further, the article 
advances a doctrinal test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of 
criminal constitutional law that combines the normative impact of the rule 
with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of fundamental 
fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality, 
comity, and financial burden. 
Part I of the Article outlines the retroactivity problem—the imbalance of 
the core values at stake and the inherent difficulty in applying the Teague 
doctrine.  Part II proposes an alternative theoretical paradigm for 
understanding and applying the concept of retroactivity—normative 
retroactivity.  Finally, in Part III, the Article describes the virtues of 
normative retroactivity. 
I.  THE RETROACTIVITY PROBLEM 
The application of the retroactivity doctrine of Teague has suffered from 
two core problems.  First, the doctrine has developed an inequity in 
 
one not only of but little consequence; it is one which is principally based . . . on a mere 
difference in the form of statement.”); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” 
in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333, 336 (1933) (finding the “alleged distinction” 
between procedure and substance unsatisfactory to find differences in meaning). 
 33 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 25 (criticizing vagueness of the Teague doctrine); Roosevelt, 
supra note 25, at 1701(suggesting that Teague should be applied case-by-case). 
 34 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2554 (stating that Teague failed to meet its self-described 
goals of fairness and finality); Blume & Pratt, supra note 31, at 354–56 (discussing Teague 
and finality); Roosevelt, supra note 31. 
 35 Roosevelt, supra note 25, at 1693–98. 
492 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
balancing the competing interests at stake.  For many years, the Court has 
prioritized the interests of finality and comity over fairness and equality 
under the law. 
Equally troubling in the Court’s analysis of the question of retroactivity 
has been the confusion created by employing a substance-procedure 
dichotomy by which to assess retroactivity.  Generally, new substantive rules 
of constitutional law apply retroactively, and procedural rules do not, but 
there is often disagreement about whether a rule is substantive or 
procedural.  This ambiguity results in lower court splits, and in many cases, 
the Court must decide the retroactivity question. 
A.  The Competing Values of Retroactivity Analysis 
1. Fundamental Fairness and Equality under the Law 
In determining whether a constitutional rule should apply retroactively 
to individuals convicted and sentenced prior to the adoption of that rule by 
the Court, the Court has articulated a series of competing considerations.  
Counseling in favor of retroactive applications are the concepts of 
fundamental fairness36 and equality under the law.37 
When the Court determines, for instance, that a particular punishment 
violates the constitutional rights of an individual, other offenders suffering 
that same punishment have two reasons to object to its continued 
imposition.  First, the punishment is unfair in its own application—meaning 
that the state punished the individual in a manner inconsistent with the 
 
 36 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (emphasizing that “selective application of 
new rules violates the principles of treating similarly situated defendants the same”); 
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 555–56 n.16 (1982) (“The problem is not merely 
the appearance of inequity, but the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses 
which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance beneficiary of a 
retroactively applied rule.”); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (“If a ‘new’ constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse lower 
courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very 
arguments we have embraced.”); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in 
Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 987 (2006) (“All of these doctrines require selection of a 
trigger point—a way of separating those who will benefit from a new decision from those 
who will not—which will almost invariably make a claimant’s eligibility for relief depend 
on something over which she had little, if any, control.”). 
 37 See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“We depart form the basic 
judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated 
defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional 
law.”); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral Review, 
91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 161 (2012) (“Society has an interest in seeing people sentenced 
correctly in accordance with its laws.  Allowing people to continue to serve years of extra 
prison time despite a plain error in their sentence undermines the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system . . . .”). 
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Constitution.  Suppose an offender received a death sentence as a 
punishment for a rape, but the Court had interpreted the Eighth 
Amendment to prohibit capital sentences for rape because death was an 
excessive sentence for rape.38  To impose a death sentence for rape would 
then be fundamentally unfair because it violates the constitutional rights of 
the offender. 
Second, the punishment could be one that is unfair in that it is unequal 
under the law.  In this context, the punishment would be unfair by 
comparison—the constitutional rule prohibited the imposition of the 
punishment on one offender, but not the other, with the only difference 
being when the state imposed the punishment.  Using the same example, a 
death sentence for a rape offense would violate conceptions of equality 
under the law because no one going forward could receive that sentence for 
that crime. 
Another word about equality under the law is instructive.  While disparity 
in sentencing outcomes between offenders who commit essentially the same 
conduct exists as an ordinary function of allowing discretion in sentencing, 
such disparities become increasingly troubling as the severity of 
punishments increases.  Indeed, the disparity in capital sentencing outcomes 
in the 1970s rose to such a level that it violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.39 
Likewise, when the sentence is no longer available because it is 
unconstitutional, the inequality under the law becomes more pronounced 
than when it is simply the product of different exercises of discretion.  As 
explored below, the impact of the newly adopted constitutional rule bears 
heavily on whether prospective application infringes upon, and to what 
degree it infringes upon, conceptions of equality under the law.40 
2. Finality, Comity, and Financial Burdens 
The Supreme Court has long trumpeted the value of finality in criminal 
cases, particularly in the context of habeas corpus appeals.41  The concept of 
 
 38 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (ruling that the death penalty is too harsh a 
punishment for rape). 
 39 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). 
 40 Note that the same fairness and rule of law concerns apply to procedural rights.  In some 
cases, denying procedural rights arising under the constitution in criminal cases can 
create even more unfairness than the denial of substantive rights. 
 41 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (“No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, 
not society as a whole is benefitted by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to 
jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be 
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 
1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Both the individual criminal defendant and 
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finality embraces the value of a final judgment that settles a criminal 
matter.42  Once a court has tried a case, found the defendant guilty, and 
sentenced the defendant, the value of finality warns against upsetting that 
judgment in all but the most extreme examples of injustice.43 
Implicit in the concept of finality is the assumption that the criminal trial 
proceeding and sentencing were fair and accorded the defendant his 
constitutional rights, giving him his day in court.44  Further, the assumption 
includes the ideas that the process was legitimate, non-arbitrary, and 
entailed the proof of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.45  
Perhaps most important, the concept of finality assumes the outcomes of the 
criminal trial and sentencing proceeding were accurate, and thus require no 
further review.46 
This presumption of accuracy, both as a matter of law and a matter of 
policy, becomes even stronger after the courts have reviewed the 
defendant’s direct appeals.47  On habeas appeal, the courts are generally 
 
society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that 
comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on 
whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be 
restored to a useful place in the community.”); Bator, supra note 14, at 471 (noting that 
throughout history “[t]he essential touchstone continued to be that the writ of habeas 
corpus was not to be used as a a writ of error, and that decisions of competent tribunals as 
to issues of fact or law bearing on convictions should be final”). 
 42 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 452 (stating that a lack of finality can undermine the 
functions of criminal law); Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on 
Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POLICY 179, 181 (2014) (defending the finality of 
criminal sentences against challenges from recent scholarship). 
 43 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 452–53 (explaining the advantages of finality); Henry J. 
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
142, 150 (1970) (stating that “conventional notions of finality” should have a place in 
criminal litigation). 
 44 Kovarsky, supra note 19, at 454 (noting that “[s]ocial acceptance of final judgment 
reflects the confidence in the institutions and procedures that produce it”); Ronald J. 
Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: Why We are Moving Towards Moratoria on Executions, and the 
Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 733, 737 (2001). 
 45 The adoption of AEDPA also contains echoes of this “full and fair” principle, such that 
receiving a full and fair proceeding closes the door on future consideration of the merits.  
See Claudia Wilner, “We Would Not Defer to that Which Did Not Exist”: AEDPA Meets the Silent 
State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1453 (2002) (noting that under AEDPA a 
reviewing federal court must defer to the reasonable decisions of the state court). 
 46 Id.; see also Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51 (examining the link between finality and 
legality); Kovarsky, supra note 19, at 454 (noting that “[s]ocial acceptance of final 
judgment reflects the confidence in the institutions and procedures that produce it”). 
 47 See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2005) 
(emphasizing that nine years after AEDPA came into effect, no state had successfully 
opted into the special capital case procedures that had been highlighted by AEDPA’s 
drafters). 
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reluctant to overturn a case based on substantive or procedural errors, based 
largely on this notion of finality.48 
To demonstrate how ingrained finality has become, one need only to 
examine the Court’s hesitancy to recognize a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence.49  Even when the petitioner can prove his actual innocence of 
the crime, courts may bar that claim based on the failure to satisfy certain 
procedural requirements.50 
As such, the principle of finality discourages retroactive application of 
new constitutional rules, particularly where such an application serves to 
reopen a significant number of cases for retrial or resentencing.  The notion 
remains, barring extreme circumstances, that final judgments should remain 
final.51 
A second, similar ground for deciding not to disturb final judgments is 
the value of comity—deference of the federal government towards the 
decisions of state governments and courts.  Criminal law has traditionally 
remained in the purview of states.  Although Congress has federalized 
certain areas—such as distribution of illegal drugs and corporate crimes—
the states still administer most of the criminal law in the United States.  The 
idea of comity counsels the Congress and the federal courts to defer to the 
determinations and actions of the state legislatures and courts where 
possible.  Federal courts on habeas review, for instance, should accord a 
high level of deference to the factual findings of state trial courts according 
to the principles of comity.  In the retroactivity context, constitutional 
interpretations should not, according to principles of comity, serve to undo 
a significant number of final criminal judgments of state courts.52 
 
 48 Kovarsky, supra note 19; Wilner, supra note 45. 
 49 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (illustrating the stringent standard which 
must be satisfied to obtain an actual innocence exception); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390 (1993) (holding that Defendant’s claim of actual innocence did not entitle him to 
federal habeas relief); Robert Batey, Federal Habeas Corpus Relief and the Death Penalty: 
“Finality with a Capital F”, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 252 (1984) (discussing the procedural 
doctrines limiting the availability of habeas relief); George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever 
Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 263, 
263–64 (2003) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s response to claims of actual innocence 
and recommending a different response). 
 50 The Court has long expressed the worry, vastly overstated, of criminal defendants 
“sandbagging” by not advancing their best claims at trial.  See Graham Hughes, 
Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 321 (1987-88) (discussing procedural default in habeas 
corpus claims). 
 51 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51 (“[I]f a criminal judgment is ever to be final, the 
notion of legality must at some point include the assignment of final competence to 
determine legality.”); Friendly, supra note 43. 
 52 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2457 (“Teague is part of the larger fabric of habeas 
decisions concerning successive petitions, procedural default, and deference to state 
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A consequence of retroactive application of new constitutional rules—
the expenditure of state resources to retry or resentence cases—provides a 
third argument against retroactivity.  In some ways the combination of 
finality and comity, this economic concern considers the degree to which a 
retroactive application would result in a heavy financial burden upon the 
states.  Thus, the financial burden argument would challenge a court to 
weigh the value of the fairness, including the likelihood of actually changing 
the circumstances of convicted individuals, against the economic cost of re-
litigating these cases.53 
3. Weighing the Competing Values 
At the heart of the analysis, then, are the values in favor of retroactive 
application of new constitutional rules—fairness and equality under the 
law—evaluated against the concerns of finality, comity, and economic 
burden.  Historically, the Court has erred on the side of the latter, creating a 
presumption that new criminal constitutional rules should apply only 
prospectively.54  As with finality more generally, inherent in this approach is 
the assumption that criminal trials are fair, provide accurate determinations 
as to guilt, and impose proportional and reasonable sentences. 
As explored below, the impact of the constitutional rule, as well as the 
likely consequences of retroactive application, bear heavily on this question 
of balancing values.  Too often, however, the Court has used difficult-to-
apply doctrinal distinctions to determine the question of retroactivity.  
These approaches unfortunately obscure the balancing of values at stake, 
and all too often simply declare finality as the end goal without considering 
fairness. 
B.  The Doctrinal Confusion of Teague 
Before exploring the Court’s retroactivity doctrine, it is instructive to 
consider the different groups of offenders to whom retroactive application 
might apply.  When the Court decides a case, the first group of offenders to 
consider are those whose cases are currently pending on direct appeal 
(“direct appellees”).  A second group will be petitioners making habeas 
 
findings, all of which put a premium on avoiding excessive interference with state court 
judgments.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (explaining that 
“[e]xtending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not impose an onerous burden 
on the States, nor does it disturb the finality of state convictions”). 
 54 Arguably, some of this tendency may be a vestige of the non-retroactivity approach of the 
Warren Court.  See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622–28 (1965) (explaining the 
Warren Court’s non-retroactivity doctrine). 
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corpus claims, collateral challenges to the constitutionality of the process 
that resulted in their punishment (“collateral appellees”).55 
Typically, a decision by the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of a 
particular criminal law or procedure applies to direct appellees.56  The 
retroactivity question, then, focuses on whether the decision applies to 
collateral appellees.  If the Court determines that the decision should only 
apply prospectively, then collateral appellees become procedurally barred 
from raising a constitutional challenge based on the new decision. 
A second consideration is whether the rule is a new one, or simply an 
application of established law.57  Where the decision falls into the latter 
category, the retroactivity bar does not apply, because the Supreme Court 
decision did not create a new rule. 
In such a situation, the applicable federal statute, the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applies, at least when the case 
involves a claim decided on the merits by a state court.58  Under section 
2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state 
merits adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”59 
Thus, if the rule was an established provision of law, it applies to the 
cases of collateral appellees because it was a rule in place at the time of their 
trial and sentencing.  And to receive a hearing on the merits, the petitioner 
must overcome AEDPA’s procedural bar.60 
 
 55 Technically, a third category of offenders consists of those that have exhausted their 
collateral appeals and must make successive challenges to their sentence (“successive 
appellees”).  For purposes of this article successive appellees will be merged with 
collateral appellees, putting aside the procedural thicket that AEDPA imposes on these 
prisoners for another time. 
 56 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding “that a new rule for the conduct 
of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, 
pending direct review or not yet final . . .”). 
 57 While the determination of whether a rule is “new” is often a difficult one, the Court 
explained in Teague that “a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or 
imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”  489 U.S. 288, 301 
(1989) (plurality opinion).  Put differently, a case announces a new rule if “the result was 
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”  
Id.  But see Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to 
Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 203, 257 (1998) (expressing doubts about whether the rule considered in Teague was a 
“new” one). 
 58 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (2006)). 
 59 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
 60 Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional 
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 607-08 (2009) (noting that judicial resource 
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In addition to AEDPA, two barriers exist to the application of an old rule 
of criminal law or procedure clarified by the Supreme Court.  First, 
collateral appellees must have, in most cases, preserved the particular claim 
as part of their appeals.  Failure to raise a claim based on an old rule of 
criminal law or procedure can bar a collateral appellee or exhausted 
appellee from raising it on appeal. 
Second, the harmless error doctrine serves to block many appeals based 
on clarifications of old criminal laws or procedures.  Courts can determine 
that, although the criminal law or procedure contained a constitutional flaw, 
the result at trial and sentencing would have been the same, rendering the 
error harmless and inconsequential.  Appellate courts that trust in the state 
criminal trial process rely heavily on the harmless error doctrine, particularly 
on collateral appeals. 
1. The Origins of the Doctrine 
As a result of the many new criminal procedure rules adopted by the 
Warren Court, questions arose concerning the application of those rules 
with respect to petitioners with cases on appeal.61  In Linkletter v. Walker,62 the 
Court considered whether the rule adopted in Mapp v. Ohio, which required 
states to exclude evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
applied to cases on direct appeal at the time.63 
The Court in Linkletter recognized that the Court’s traditional practice 
had been to apply its decisions in criminal cases prospectively.64  The reason 
for this approach was the idea that the role of the Court was to interpret law, 
not make it.65  The Court, however, continued its trend toward embracing 
more realist and less formalist approaches to decision-making in Linkletter.66  
 
constraints create a de facto procedural bar, even though courts have discretion to reach 
the merits on cases otherwise barred). 
 61 For an excellent discussion of the development of the law in this area, see BRANDON L. 
GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POST-
CONVICTION LITIGATION (2013). 
 62 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
 63 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Linkletter, 281 U.S. at 619–20. 
 64 Linkletter, 318 U.S. at 622–23 (“At common law there was no authority for the proposition 
that judicial decisions made law only for the future.  Blackstone stated the rule that the 
duty of the court was not to ‘pronounce a new rule of law, but to maintain and expound 
the old one.’  This Court followed that rule [in past cases]. . . .  The judge rather than 
being the creator of the law was but its discoverer.”) (citations omitted). 
 65 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (arguing for the formalist approach of 
discovering law, not making it); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 (explaining that the 
court’s duty is not to make new law). 
 66 Linkletter, 318 U.S. 618.  During the 1930s and 1940s, however, the Supreme Court moved 
away from legal formalism or classicism in a number of cases, moving toward a more 
realist view of decision-making.  See generally WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF 
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Specifically, the Court held that to determine the retroactive application of a 
rule, it must examine the “prior history of the rule in question, its purpose 
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its 
operation.”67  In doing so, the Court determined that Mapp applied to 
prisoners whose cases were still on direct review, but not those whose cases 
were final.68 
In the debate that followed Linkletter, two important concerns emerged 
that justified the prospective application of new constitutional rules.69  First, 
the retroactivity question gave justices skeptical about the new constitutional 
rule a second venue to challenge, or at least limit, its application.70  Also, the 
decision not to apply a new decision retroactively might make the new 
constitutional rule more palatable to members of the Court, particularly 
when the new rule was a disruptive one.71  In Mackey v. United States, for 
instance, Justice John Marshall Harlan II called the prospective application 
of new rules “a technique that provided an impetus . . . for the 
implementation of long overdue reforms, which otherwise could not 
practicably be effected.”72 
Soon, however, the Court began to rethink the Linkletter principle, 
mostly based on the confusion resulting from its application.73  Justice 
Harlan, in particular, criticized Linkletter, and offered his own alternative 
two-part analysis.74  He first argued that the Court should give retroactive 
 
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA 1886–1937 (1998) (tracing 
the historical arc of classic legal thought in America). 
 67 Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. 
 68 Id. at 627. 
 69 See generally, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1733–49 (1991)(discussing general theory 
of constitutional remedies, arguing “new” law doctrines all raise issues best analyzed as 
involving constitutional remedies); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreward: The High Court, the Great 
Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77–79 (1965) (arguing that 
new decisions should always apply retroactively to decisions on direct appeal). 
 70 Mapp and Linkletter demonstrate this phenomenon, exposing the judicial discomfort with 
widespread application of the exclusionary rule.  Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) (forbidding state courts from admitting illegally obtained evidence in a criminal 
case), with Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636–37 (recognizing that the breadth of Mapp made 
retrospective application both unfeasible and unwarranted in light of the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule).  Likewise, Scalia’s dissent in Montgomery, for instance, exudes this type 
of sentiment—that the initial decision was incorrect, and thus should be narrowed.  See 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 (2016) (noting that the implicit difficulty in 
administering the prior rule is exacerbated when it is applied retroactively). 
 71 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
 72 Id. at 676 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 73 See, e.g., Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (breaking from the Linkletter rule). 
 74 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court’s subsequent decisions have changed the rule articulated in Linkletter); 
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692–93 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing about the application of new procedural due process rules articulated by the 
Court). 
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effect to decisions that constitutionally prohibited the punishment of 
previously-punishable conduct.75  Justice Harlan also asserted that the 
federal courts should give retroactive effect to newly-announced procedural 
rules that were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”76  While never 
adopted during his time on the Court, Justice Harlan’s ideas influenced the 
development of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.77  In Griffith v. 
Kentucky, the Court held that new rules applied to cases on direct review.78  
Following Justice Harlan, the Court reasoned that “the integrity of judicial 
review” requires the application of the new rule to “all similar cases pending 
on direct review.”79 
Then, in Teague v. United States, the Court again channeled Justice 
Harlan’s ideas and adopted the current test for retroactivity for new rules of 
criminal constitutional law with respect to cases on collateral review.80  In 
Teague, the Court considered whether its decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 
which prohibited racial discrimination in jury selection,81 applied 
retroactively to Teague’s case, which was on collateral review.82 
In holding that the Batson decision did not apply retroactively, the 
plurality in Teague articulated a two-part test similar to Justice Harlan’s test.83  
Emphasizing that the application of new rules retroactively to cases on 
collateral appeal should be narrow, the Court limited such application to 
two situations.  The new rule applied retroactively either where the new rule 
made the conduct in question no longer criminal or where the new rule 
involved procedures “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”84  In 
adopting this test, the Court emphasized the values of comity and finality 
with respect to collateral appeals, noting the essential nature of both 
concepts to operation of the criminal justice system.85 
 
 75 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 76 Id. at 693; see also Blume & Pratt, supra note 31, at 338 (“[O]ver time, changes in both 
social capacity and the expectations held of the judicial system can ‘alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the 
fairness of a particular conviction.”). 
 77 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16; Hoffman, supra note 25. 
 78 Griffith, 479 U.S. 314; see also Mishkin, supra note 69 (making the argument eventually 
adopted in Griffith). 
 79 Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322–23. 
 80 Teague v. United States, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 81 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 82 Teague, 489 U.S. at 294; Hoffman, supra note 25. 
 83 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13. 
 84 Id. at 311–13. 
 85 Id. at 308. 
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2. The Application of the Doctrine 
After Teague, the Court refined the two categories of exceptions, terming 
the first one “substantive” and the second one “procedural.”86  Under the 
substantive prong, the Court has held that certain new rules apply 
retroactively to cases on collateral appeal because they forbade criminalizing 
certain previously-criminal conduct or banned imposition of certain 
punishments on certain classes of offenders.87 
The Court also has added the proviso that procedural rules do not apply 
retroactively unless they are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure.88  The 
Court, though, has rejected every claim since Teague that a particular 
procedural rule fits the watershed category, as the rules in question have not 
implicated the “fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding”.89  It has explained that Gideon v. Wainwright, where the Court 
held that state courts must provide all felony defendants with a lawyer, is an 
example of a watershed rule, but has declined to find any other new 
procedural rules as fitting the exception.90  Even in Crawford v. Washington, 
where the Court broadened the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to prohibit the admission of hearsay statements without cross-
examination,91 the Court held that the new procedural rule did not meet the 
“watershed” threshold.92 
For practical purposes, then, the substantive exception to the Teague bar 
provides the only real opportunity for retroactive application of new rules of 
 
 86 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728–29 (2016) (noting Teague created an 
exception from the general bar of retroactivity for “new substantive rules of constitutional 
law” and new “watershed rules of criminal procedure” that raise issues of accuracy and 
fundamental fairness). 
 87 Id. at 729–30.  There are several examples of this kind of case.  See, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring capital sentencing of juvenile offenders); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional 
because the Due Process Clause allows individuals to engage in consentual sexual 
conduct “without intervention of the government”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 
(2002) (holding that offenders with mental retardation cannot receive death sentences). 
 88 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728, 730 (referring to “watershed procedural rules”  as the 
second Teague exception and explaining why changes in procedural rules do not 
automatically trigger retroactive application). 
 89 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 
(1990)); see also Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (“[I]n the years since 
Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for 
watershed status.”). 
 90 See, e.g., Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996) (referring to the Gideon rule as a 
“paradigmatic example” of the watershed rule exception); see generally Justin F. Marceau, 
Gideon’s Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482 (2013) (exploring the significance of Gideon more 
generally). 
 91 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
 92 Whorton, 549 U.S. at 421. 
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criminal constitutional law to cases on collateral appeal.  As such, the 
Court’s determination of whether a new rule is substantive or procedural 
becomes paramount. 
3. The Confusion Inherent in the Doctrine 
Unfortunately, the distinction between substantive and procedural rules 
is often unclear.93  At the margins, one can certainly separate the two 
concepts, despite their apparent fluidity.94  Rules that eliminate particular 
crimes are clearly substantive.95  The decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which 
decriminalized sodomy, provides a good example of an obvious substantive 
rule.96 
Similarly, procedural rules that lack any doctrinal vestments and are 
substance-neutral, as Jeremy Bentham defined procedure, are clearly 
procedural under Teague.97  Most procedural rules, however, have some 
substantive component to them.98  While the procedure may still be simply a 
means to an end, the underlying requirements impose substantive duties on 
the litigants.99 
The Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana concerning the 
retroactivity of its decision in Miller provides a clear example of the 
confusion that arises from the substance-procedure dichotomy mandated by 
Teague.100  Miller held that mandatory life-without-parole (“LWOP”) 
 
 93 See generally sources cited supra note 32; D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” 
Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions”, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 189, 189–90 (1982) (describing the history of the substance-procedure 
distinction). 
 94 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724–25 (1974) 
(observing that “[w]e were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the 
line between substance and procedure” but recognizing it is possible to give meaning to 
each term); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 
YALE L.J. 333, 337, 340–44 (1933) (explaining that the utility of the terms depends on the 
meaning that one gives them); Risinger, supra note 93, at 204–09 (developing a 
framework for defining “procedural” and “substantive”). 
 95 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
judgments in part and dissenting in part) (stating that instances in which an individual is 
convicted for constitutionally protected actions presents “the clearest instance where 
finality interests should yield”). 
 96 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 97 See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH 
PRACTICE 477 (1827) (using the term “adjective” law as an idea separate from substantive 
law); Risinger, supra note 93, at 205–06 (describing purely procedural law as being solely 
concerned with “considerations of rational accuracy and time efficiency”). 
 98 See sources cited supra notes 32 and 93. 
 99 See Risinger, supra note 93, at 209–11 (exploring how procedural regulations often beget 
substantive policies). 
100 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
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sentences imposed on juvenile offenders constituted cruel and unusual 
punishments in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.101 
The question, then, is whether the rule adopted in Miller is procedural or 
substantive.  The rule appears procedural in that it prohibits mandatory 
LWOP sentences, with the remedy being the provision of a new sentencing 
proceeding in which a judge can determine the appropriate sentence.  The 
constitutional error in Miller involved the identity of the decision-maker with 
reference to the petitioner’s sentence, with the court, not the legislature, 
being the constitutionally-mandated venue.102 
On the other hand, mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles constitute 
a substantive category of sentence that the Constitution now prohibits.103  
Considered as a unitary concept, a mandatory LWOP sentence creates 
constitutional infirmities because of the combination of the substantive 
characteristics of the sentence (mandatory), the sentence (LWOP), and the 
offender (a juvenile).  The retroactivity question under Teague therefore 
turns on whether the decision in Miller removed a substantive sentencing 
option from the trial court’s purview or, alternatively, simply required an 
additional procedure in cases involving juveniles. 
In Montgomery, the Court held that the Miller decision was a substantive 
one, relying heavily upon the precedents upon which Miller relied.104  Miller 
echoes two of the Court’s prior decisions in the capital context—Woodson v. 
North Carolina,105 which banned mandatory death sentences, and Roper v. 
Simmons,106 which banned the execution of juvenile offenders.107 
The latter clearly provides an example of a substantive decision in that it 
removed death as a possible sentence for juvenile offenders.108  The former, 
though, also was a substantive decision in the Court’s eyes because it did 
more than simply ban mandatory death sentences; it required individualized 
 
101 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
102 Id. at 2475 (holding that the judge or jury must be able to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshes possible penalty on juveniles). 
103 Id. at 2483–84. 
104 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–36. 
105 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
106 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
107 Both Woodson and Roper applied retroactively.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–29; Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72, 72 n.2 (1987) (indicating that states uniformly applied Woodson 
retroactively). 
108 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–33 (explaining the rule from Roper 
is substantive because it “goes beyond the manner of determining a defendant’s 
sentence”); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989); Mackey v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (explaining that new constitutional rules limiting the types of 
sentences that can be levied against certain classes of defendants are substantive in 
nature). 
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sentencing consideration.109  Thus, for the Court, the substantive component 
of the sentencing decision with respect to juvenile offenders, and not just 
the need to have the Court (and not the legislature) determine the sentence 
in the first place, made the decision in Miller a substantive one, despite its 
outcome requiring a new procedure in certain cases.110 
The potential for confusion concerning whether a certain court decision 
applies retroactively based on the substance-procedure dichotomy is not just 
an academic concern.  Rather, a number of cases have resulted in circuit 
splits and the finding of different outcomes with respect to whether a certain 
new rule applies retroactively.111 
 
109 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) 
(Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (plurality opinion) (holding mandatory imposition of 
death penalty violative of the Eight Amendment); see Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 
2467 (2012) (explaining that the Woodson court found mandatory impositions of the 
death penalty unconstitutional because it prevented the defendant from introducing, and 
the sentencing authority from considering, substantive evidence of factors). 
110 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734–35 (emphasizing that because Miller rendered LWOP an 
unconstitutional penalty to a class of criminals—“juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect 
the transient immaturity of youth”—it announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, 
regardless of the procedural component necessary to substantiate this substantive 
guarantee). 
111 See, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013) rev’g 683 F.3d 740 (6th Cir. 
2012) (holding retroactive application of People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Mich. 
2001) (revoking “dimished capacity” defense based on that court’s first hearing of 
statutory interpretation issue), violated the Due Process Clause); Chaidez v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106–07, 1113 (2013) (noting split among federal and state courts 
regarding the retroactive application of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) before 
adopting Seventh Circuit’s view that Padilla announced a new rule that does not have 
retroactive effect); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010) (declining to extend 
retroactive rule allowing sentencing authority discretion to impose sentence below range 
advised by the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual to judges 
considering modifying sentences in statutorily outlined proceedings); Carr v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 438, 444 (2010) (noting that there is a circuit split on how to interpret 
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act to avoid ex post facto implications); 
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266–68 (2008) (mentioning that states were divided 
on whether or not they could apply new rules of constitutional criminal procedure more 
broadly than as laid out in Teague); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007) 
(noting that the Ninth Circuit opinion that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
should apply retroactively conflicted with the decisions of every other federal circuit and 
state supreme court that addressed the issue); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 356 
(2005) (citing diverging views amongst the Courts of Appeals over when the limitiation 
period, during which a federal prisoner must file a motion to correct his or her sentence, 
begins to run in cases where the Supreme Court has recognized a new right that is 
retroactively applicable); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2004) (observing 
that the Ninth Circuit’s determination that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was a 
new substantive rule because it reshaped the structure of the Arizona murder law directly 
conflicted with a decision of the Arizona Supreme Court); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 
409–10 (2004) (admonishing the Third Circuit for failing to complete Teague analysis 
after accepting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a case was 
retroactively applicable). 
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While the substance-procedure dichotomy may be clear at the margins, 
in practice it creates significant doctrinal confusion and disparities in lower 
courts such that the Supreme Court must determine the retroactivity 
question.  In essence, the Court often ends up hearing the same case twice 
because it does not decide the retroactivity question during the initial 
decision and the application of the Teague rule is unclear. 
The lack of clarity of the Teague doctrinal rule concerning retroactivity 
continues to plague litigants and courts alike based on its inherent 
uncertainty.112  The potential ambiguity arising from the substance-
procedure dichotomy also creates the opportunity for lower courts to align 
the retroactivity question with their view of the new constitutional rule.113  If 
lower courts favor the rule, they will be more likely to find the rule to be 
substantive; if lower courts disfavor the rule, they will be more likely to find 
the rule to be procedural.114 
Another problem with the substance-procedure dichotomy lies in its 
disconnect with the competing values at stake.  The underlying assumption 
suggests that prospective application of substantive rules somehow evoke a 
greater degree of unfairness than procedural rules.  While this is sometimes 
true, it is certainly not always the case.  And even so, it undervalues 
procedural rules and their potential for unfairness. 
Likewise, it is not clear that finality becomes more important in cases 
involving procedural errors than those involving substantive errors.  It is 
certainly possible that finding a substantive rule retroactive in some cases 
could have a much more significant impact on the finality of cases than a 
particular procedural rule would.  The same is true for the value of comity.  
Deferring to state courts may or may not be more appropriate in cases 
involving new procedural rules as opposed to substantive ones. 
Even worse, the substance-procedure dichotomy does not provide for a 
direct weighing of these values.  To be sure, the Court embraces or rejects 
the applicable value post hoc depending on whether it chooses to apply a new 
 
112 See Bandes, supra note 25, at 2455 (“However, Teague leads to unfairness on a much 
grander scale.  The decision merely succeeds in creating a new arbitrary category of 
remediless prisoners: those whose cases happen to be on collateral, rather than direct, 
review at the auspicious moment when the Court hands down a decision classified as ‘new 
law.’ . . . [T]he Court’s goal of eliminating the unfair application of retroactivity rules is 
virtually unattainable.  The only way to eliminate all disparity would be to make every rule 
completely retroactive.”) (citations omitted). 
113 See Fisch, supra note 15, at 1083–84 (noting the argument that in deciding whether or not 
to apply a rule retroactively courts often “disassociate” the applicability of the rule with 
their desired outcome, and thus may decide that the parties are not entitled to the relief 
the retroactive rule provides). 
114 See id.; see also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (commenting on the result-
oriented considerations that initially motivated “retroactivity” doctrine). 
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rule retroactively.  But there is no obvious link between substantive rules or 
procedural rules and the concepts the Court ought to balance in answering 
the question of retroactivity. 
Given the inherent flaws in the Teague test, demonstrated by the Court’s 
recent history of granting certiorari to answer questions of retroactivity, this 
Article endeavors to offer an alternative theoretical framework by which to 
consider the concept of retroactivity. 
II.  NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY 
Instead of relying on the substance-procedure distinction, the concept of 
normative retroactivity frames the retroactivity inquiry in terms of the 
normative impact of the new constitutional rule at issue.115  As explained 
below, by framing the retroactivity question in terms of normative impact, 
the competing values of fairness, equality under the law, finality, and comity 
play a more significant role in the retroactivity determination. 
In this context, normativity refers to the impact of the new rule, its 
practical consequence with respect to criminal trials and/or sentencing.  As 
a general matter, the degree to which the Court ought to require state 
courts to revisit final determinations on collateral review should relate 
directly to the hardship the failure to do so would impose in terms of 
fundamental fairness.116 
A.  Cataloging Normative Impact 
The adoption of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure falls 
into one of two broad categories: (1) a decision that bears on the trial 
court’s determination of guilt or innocence, or (2) a decision that bears on 
the sentencing determination. 
In the guilt-innocence category, there is a spectrum of possible impacts 
of a new constitutional rule.  On one end of the spectrum lie the “easy” 
retroactivity cases, where the Court has determined that criminalizing 
 
115 It is important to note that the theory of normative retroactivity applies to the application 
of the retroactivity question to cases on collateral appeal.  As noted above, new rules 
already apply to cases on direct appeal.  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) 
(holding that new rules “for the conduct of criminal prosecutions” apply retroactively, 
regardless of whether or not they present a “clear break” from previous law); see also 
Mishkin, supra note 69, at 77 (declaring that retroactive application of the new rule 
established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to convictions not yet final was 
“normal”). 
116 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 25, at 2465-66 (criticizing the Teague court for overreliance on 
logic and lamenting that it was not more guided by fairness and justice). 
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certain conduct violates the Constitution.117  Clearly, individuals imprisoned 
for conduct no longer deemed criminal should receive the benefit of 
retroactive application of the new constitutional rule.118 
On the other end of the spectrum lie cases where the constitutional rule 
tangentially impacts the evidence admitted during the guilt phase of the 
trial, but not in a way likely to have any influence on the guilt determination.  
Here, retroactivity seems less appropriate because its application would 
result in the retrial of cases without changing the ultimate outcome.119 
In the sentencing context, a similar spectrum exists.  Cases in which the 
defendant received a sentence that the new rule makes unconstitutional 
should receive a retroactive application.120  By contrast, new rules that have 
only a tangential effect on the sentencing determination should not have a 
retroactive application.121 
Interestingly, the stakes seem higher on both sides of the value spectrum 
in the guilt-innocence context.  Where a new constitutional rule’s 
application would raise serious doubts about the offender’s innocence, the 
fundamental fairness concern seems particularly high.122  At the same time, 
retrying the case imposes a significant burden on the state, in terms of 
 
117 Obvious examples of this would include: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
118 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691–93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (commenting that new rules that render criminal statutes 
regulating certain actions unconstitutional presents the clearest instance in which a rule 
should apply retroactively). 
119 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 14, at 526–28 (articulating that on collateral review in habeas 
cases, federal courts should have the power to determine such errors harmless). 
120 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding death penalty 
unconstitutional for conviction on child rape charge where victim was not killed); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding imposition of death sentence upon juvenile 
offenders unconstitutional); Atkins, v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding sentencing 
mentally disabled individuals to death unconstitutional). 
121 Examples might include: Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (determining that the 
Courts of Appeals should apply an “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing a 
District Court’s sentencing determination); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) 
(clarifying the steps required when a District Court determines an appropriate sentence 
while treating the United States Sentencing Comission’s Guidelines Manual as advisory); 
and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (holding that the Courts of Appeals may 
presume that a properly calculated sentence under the United States Sentencing 
Comission’s Guidelines Manual is reasonable).  But see Roosevelt, supra note 25, at 1702 
(arguing for retroactive application of United State v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) on a 
case-by-case basis in these types of cases). 
122 Note that innocence here refers to innocence under the statute.  Fourth Amendment 
rules, for instance, that prohibit admission of facts into evidence, would bear directly on 
guilt in this way, even though the defendant may have engaged in deviant conduct. 
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upsetting a final determination, ignoring comity considerations, and 
increasing costs.123 
By contrast, the sentencing context seems less significant in terms of 
both sets of values, unless the offender is challenging a death sentence or 
life-without-parole sentence.124  In non-death cases,125 revisiting the 
sentencing determination may adjust the sentence, but the indeterminacy of 
the sentencing process itself makes a slightly longer sentence seem less 
unfair than imprisoning an innocent offender. 
Similarly, the values of finality and comity seem less offended by 
resentencing an offender.  Because most states have, at one time, had a 
parole system, resentencing seems like much less of a burden than retrying a 
case.  Unlike a retrial, where evidence may have gone stale and witnesses 
may be unavailable, a resentencing can make use of new information about 
the offender’s time in prison, and is generally a much less procedurally 
burdensome process. 
In sum, the theoretical step taken by normative retroactivity shifts the 
focus onto the degree to which the new rule affects guilt-innocence 
determinations and sentencing determinations from the past, in the present, 
and for the future.  Where the impact is significant, retroactivity becomes 
the favored outcome, largely because the impact magnifies the value of 
unfairness while minimizing the value of finality. 
B.  The Normative Retroactivity Test 
1. An Overview of the Test 
The normative retroactivity test has two parts: the impact inquiry and the 
balancing of values.  As indicated above, its application differs depending on 
whether the constitutional rule bears on the guilt-innocence determination 
or sentencing determination. 
With respect to the guilt-innocence determination, the impact inquiry 
asks whether, and to what degree, the new constitutional rule would have 
impacted the guilt-innocence determination at trial in the majority of cases 
on collateral or successive review.  At the extremes of the above-described 
spectrum, the application is easy and does not require application of the 
 
123 See Bator, supra note 14, at 451 (emphasizing that finality in a legal proceeding allows for 
conservation of resources). 
124 In many ways, these sentences are functional equivalents.  William W. Berry III, More 
Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 1109, 1123–24 (2010) 
(exploring the similarities between sentences of death and life without parole). 
125 William W. Berry III, Life-With-Hope Sentencing, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 1051, 1053–54 (2015) 
(arguing that LWOP sentences should be considered to be in the same category if not 
worse than death sentences). 
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second question.  Where the new constitutional rule decriminalizes the 
conduct, the new rule applies retroactively.  Where the new constitutional 
rule has a de minimis impact on the guilt-innocence determinations, it does 
not apply retroactively. 
Most cases, however, will not fall into either “easy” category.  In such 
cases, the impact inquiry assesses whether the new rule has a significant 
impact, a medium impact, or a minor impact on the guilt-innocence 
determinations of cases on collateral appeal. 
Having established where the case generally falls on the spectrum, the 
normative retroactivity test then requires the balancing of retroactivity 
values.126  In other words, the Court must weigh the interests of fundamental 
fairness and equality under the law against the competing interests of 
finality, comity, and financial burden of retrying cases.  In this weighing, 
however, the impact test should serve as a thumb on the scale in the 
determination.  Where the new constitutional rule has a significant impact 
on the guilt-innocence determination, then the presumption should be in 
favor of retroactivity.  Where the new constitutional rule has only a de 
minimis impact on the guilt-innocence determination, then the presumption 
should be against retroactivity. 
It is in the hard cases in the middle where the balancing part of the test 
does the heavy lifting.  In such cases, the Court should weigh the likelihood 
that application of the rule would result in finding some petitioners 
innocent against the economic cost, finality considerations, and comity 
concerns of retrying these cases. 
In the sentencing context, the normative retroactivity test has a similar 
application.  First, the Court must ask whether the new rule has a 
meaningful impact on the sentence of the offender.  As with the guilt-
innocence determination, there are easy cases in the context of the 
sentencing determination.  Where a sentence would no longer be available 
for particular conduct or a particular type of offender, the application of the 
new rule should be retroactive.  By contrast, where the new rule would have 
only a de minimis impact on the sentencing outcome, the application of the 
new rule should be prospective with respect to collateral appellees. 
Where the impact test does not clearly answer the question, the Court 
should ask whether the impact of the new rule on sentencing outcomes is 
 
126 Clearly this is not an exact science, but is the kind of process that courts engage in all of 
the time.  See Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court’s 
Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 757 (1963) (explaining that when the Supreme 
Court is considering a conflict between individual constitutional rights and an assertion 
of governmental power it adjudicates by “weighing the competing interest”) (citation 
omitted); Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 586 (1988) 
(defining the “balancing test” as a method of adjudicating that allows judges to avoid 
formalistic rules and, instead, balance the interests of the parties). 
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significant, involving capital sentences, life sentences, or removing 
mandatory sentences; meaningful; or minor.  The Court should then apply 
the same balancing test—weighing fairness and equality under the law 
against finality and comity.  Again, the impact test should serve as a thumb 
on the scale.  Where the effect of the new constitutional rule on sentencing 
outcomes is significant, the presumption should be in favor of retroactivity.  
Where the effect of the new constitutional rule on sentencing outcomes is 
minor, the presumption should be against retroactivity. 
As with the guilt-innocence determination, the hard cases use the 
balancing test to provide clarity where the impact test cannot.  So, where the 
new rule has some meaningful effect on sentencing outcomes, but not a 
drastic one, the balancing of the competing values will determine the 
outcome.  In such situations, the Court must weigh the likely length of 
shortening sentences and the unfairness of choosing not to do so against the 
costs of resentencing and the values of comity and finality. 
Finally, it is possible in some rare cases that the new constitutional rule 
will bear both on the guilt-innocence determination and the sentencing 
determination.  In such cases, the Court should apply the normative 
retroactivity test to both determinations to assess whether the rule should 
apply retroactivity in either, or perhaps both, contexts. 
2. Application to Montgomery and Welch 
To demonstrate the value of the normative retroactivity test, it is 
instructive to explore how it might apply to Montgomery v. Louisiana and 
Welch v. United States, the Court’s most recent retroactivity decisions.127  As 
discussed, the question in Montgomery was whether the Court’s new 
constitutional rule adopted in Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively to cases 
on collateral appeal.128  The rule in Miller determined that the Eighth 
Amendment barred the imposition of mandatory juvenile life-without-parole 
sentences.129  Lower courts split over the question of whether this rule was 
substantive or procedural under Teague.  In a narrow 6-3 decision, the Court 
held that it applied retroactively because it articulated a substantive rule 
under the Teague doctrine.130 
Under the normative retroactivity test, the first question would be to 
determine whether the new rule impacted the guilt-innocence 
determination, the sentencing determination, or both.  Miller clearly 
 
127 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 
(2016). 
128 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725. 
129 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
130 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
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restricts the sentence that states and federal courts can impose against 
juvenile offenders.131  As a result, the sentencing part of the normative 
retroactivity test would apply. 
A court would then apply the impact test to assess what impact applying 
the sentence retroactively would have on sentencing outcomes.  In Miller, 
the sentence at issue—a mandatory LWOP sentence—is no longer 
available.132  As a result, it looks like it falls into the category of “easy cases,” 
where the new rule has removed a possible sentencing outcome.  The result 
would then be the retroactive application of the rule to all juveniles 
sentenced with mandatory LWOP sentences. 
One might argue, in line with the substance-procedure set of arguments 
in Miller, that the sentence itself, life-without-parole, is still constitutionally 
available, and the consequence of Miller is simply to restrict the manner of 
its application.  If one took this view under the normative retroactivity test, 
the result would be the same.  The impact of the new constitutional rule on 
the sentencing process is significant—a resentencing could mean the 
difference between a death-in-custody sentence and the possibility of having 
some meaningful chance at life outside of prison. 
Given that the impact of the new rule is clearly significant, there would 
be a strong presumption in favor of retroactivity.  The Court would balance 
the competing values of fairness and equality under the law against finality, 
comity, and cost, but would find in favor of retroactivity, particularly given 
the thumb on the scale.  The costs of resentencing, as indicated by Justice 
Kennedy, could be minimal—the state court would simply need to provide 
the opportunity for parole.133 
The unfairness of the LWOP sentence (with its own kind of finality) 
would outweigh state interests in finality, as the consequence in most cases 
would simply be to shorten the sentence or adopt a similar sentence with a 
sentencing hearing.  Comity is likewise a less important value in this 
context—the consequence of dying in prison far outweighs the 
inconvenience suffered by resentencing.  Finally, the fairness considerations 
are significant in this context.  The United States is the only nation in the 
world that imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.134  To require a 
court to consider whether an offender should really receive this sentence, 
instead of automatically apply it, seems a fair request. 
 
131 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
132 Id. 
133 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
134 Saki Knafo, Here are All the Countries Where Children are Sentenced to Die in Prison, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-life-without-
parole_n_3962983.html. 
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In Welch v. United States, the Court faced an entirely different new rule of 
constitutional law.135  The issue in Welch was whether the Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States applied retroactively.136  In Johnson, the Court held 
that the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague 
in violation of the Due Process clause.137  The statute provided for a 
mandatory minimum sentence for offenders who had received three violent 
felonies.138  The constitutional defect rested in the vagueness residual clause, 
which defined “violent felonies” to include any felony that “involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”139 
Under the Teague test, the Court held that the new constitutional rule 
was substantive.140  First, it noted that the rule altered the lawful statutory 
sentencing range for a crime, removing the availability of the mandatory 
punishment under the statute as written.141  Likewise, the Court explained 
that the new rule invalidated an element of a criminal offense that required 
the imposition of a mandatory sentence.142 
And yet, as with Miller, one can see why the Teague test might cause 
confusion.  The removal of a mandatory sentencing option typically does not 
remove the availability of sentence itself.  Those less inclined to apply 
Johnson retroactively might argue that the constitutional rule simply altered 
the procedure—that sentencing under the ACCA is now a judicial and not a 
legislative determination.  These arguments, however, carry less weight with 
the ACCA in particular because, without the violent felony provision, the 
statute imposes a ten-year statutory maximum on offenders.143  Thus, the 
consequence of the new constitutional rule is to replace a fifteen-year 
statutory minimum with a ten-year statutory maximum, making the 
determination appear substantive.144 
Applying the normative retroactivity test to Welch begins with the 
question of whether the new constitutional rule impacts the question of 
guilt-innocence or sentencing.  The ACCA provision in question addresses a 
 
135 See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264–65 (2016) (identifying the new rule laid 
down in a previous decision). 
136 Id. at 1264. 
137 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015). 
138 Id. at 2555. 
139 Id. 
140 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (2016); see generally Leah M. Litman, Residual 
Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 60–63, 65–73 (2015); Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the 
Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SEN’G REP. 45, 47 (2015). 
141 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). 
142 Id. 
143 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a), (e) (2015). 
144 Indeed, the DOJ agreed with the petitioner’s determination as to retroactivity.  Welch v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (2016). 
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sentencing enhancement, not a question of guilt-innocence. Specifically, 
Johnson’s new constitutional rule provides that a Court cannot impose a 
mandatory sentence under the ACCA section in question because it is 
unconstitutionally vague.145 
The normative retroactivity test would then assess the impact of the new 
constitutional rule on sentencing.  Because the new rule removes a possible 
sentence from consideration—the fifteen-year mandatory minimum—and 
replaces it with a ten-year statutory maximum, the case looks like it would 
fall into the category of “easy cases,” and Johnson would apply retroactively.  
Even if one did not place it in the category of easy cases, it is clear that the 
impact of the new constitutional rule on criminal sentences would be 
significant.  The difference in the sentencing outcome would be at least five 
years and, in many cases, a decade of time outside of prison.  By replacing a 
fifteen-year minimum with a ten-year maximum, many offenders might have 
already served their sentence and would receive immediate release upon 
retroactive application. 
As a result of the impact of the new rule on sentencing outcomes, the 
presumption would be in favor of retroactivity.  Applying the competing 
values would not upset this presumption.  In some cases, the unfairness of a 
sentencing enhancement that resulted in at least a 50% sentencing increase 
based on an unconstitutionally vague provision is significant.  The unfairness 
might be less in other cases where the three felonies clearly involved violent 
acts. 
In terms of finality and costs of resentencing, though, the burden would 
be insignificant.  In many cases, the federal government could simply release 
the offender, or manually change the sentence, lowering it to the statutory 
maximum of ten years.  As such, the resentencing proceedings would not 
raise serious finality issues.  Finally, the value of comity would not apply in 
this case, as it involved federal, not state, sentencing. 
C.  When Fairness Should Trump Finality 
The real problem with the application of the Teague doctrine rests in its 
favoring of the principles of finality and comity over the values of 
fundamental fairness and equality under the law.  Indeed, under Teague, the 
presumption remains strongly in favor of prospective application of new 
constitutional rules to criminal cases on collateral appeal.  As expressed in 
Professor Paul Bator’s seminal article on the issue, the overall sentiment with 
respect to state court criminal proceedings was that generally, such 
 
145 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015) (“[T]he residual clause 
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause 
tolerates.”). 
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procedures were full and fair, according criminal defendants adequate 
process and consideration.146 
In the decades since Bator’s article and the Supreme Court’s embrace of 
this set of assumptions concerning state criminal proceedings, a different 
picture has emerged.  The growing innocence movement suggests that state 
procedures are replete with errors, constitutional and otherwise.  The 
availability of DNA evidence, new understandings of the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony, the discovery of sham expert testimony,147 the 
unreliability of forensic evidence procedures, the inappropriate conduct of 
some police officers, and the widespread evidence of racial discrimination at 
all levels of the criminal justice system, have all cast doubt on the degree to 
which state court proceedings should receive any deference.148  Indeed, in 
capital cases, the error rate—the percentage of cases in which a 
constitutional error occurs requiring a retrial—is almost seventy percent.149 
The sheer volume of injustice—over 1800 innocent people have served 
time in prison—suggests that revisiting criminal trials and sentencing 
determinations might be worth the effort in many cases.150  As to sentencing, 
the mass incarceration epidemic likewise counsels in favor of revisiting 
sentencing decisions.  The United States currently incarcerates more people 
than any nation in the history of the world, with almost 1 in 100 citizens 
serving prison sentences.151  Certainly, the Court’s over-emphasis on finality 
in habeas cases and the Bureau of Prisons restrictions on compassionate 
release152 have contributed to this epidemic. 
 
146 Bator, supra note 14, at 450–51. 
147 The FBI apparently faked an entire field of forensic science.  See Dahlia Lithwick, 
Pseudoscience in the Witness Box, SLATE.COM (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/04/fbi_s_flawed_forensics_expert_
testimony_hair_analysis_bite_marks_fingerprints.html (reporting on a decades-long 
practice of submitting false testimony against criminal defendants). 
148 See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iii–xii (2015) 
(providing a non-exhaustive list casting into doubt the criminal justice system as 
fundamentally just); see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756, 2759 (2015) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the difficulty of investigating the circumstances surrounding an 
execution for a crime that took place long ago, researchers have found convincing 
evidence that, in the past three decades, innocent people have been 
executed. . . . [T]here is significantly more research-based evidence today indicating that 
courts sentence to death individuals who may well be actually innocent or whose 
convictions (in the law’s view) do not warrant the death penalty’s application.”). 
149 James S. Liebman, et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 1839, 1849–50 (1999). 
150 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (identifying over 1800 exonerations). 
151 William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 77 (2015). 
152 See generally William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the 
Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009). 
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In light of this modern reality of errors and flaws persisting in the 
criminal justice system, finality ought to receive much less weight than in the 
past.  When the chances are high that final determinations contain 
constitutional errors, courts should not forego robust judicial review in the 
name of finality. 
The same is also true with comity.  The volume of errors and mistakes in 
state courts, the practices of many prosecutors, and the inherent conflicts of 
interest that pervade the criminal justice system make the idea of comity 
illusory.  For the federal government to respect state court proceedings 
when they follow basic rule of law principles is one thing; to stand idly by in 
the name of comity in the face of widespread malfeasance is another. 
Thus, while the values of comity and finality should remain part of the 
calculus when assessing retroactivity, these ideas should no longer play the 
dominant role they have played in denying collateral appellees relief. 
Just as the status quo has diminished the ideas of finality and comity, it 
has increased the weight that courts should accord to the concept of 
fundamental fairness.  When the likelihood of unfairness is high, 
investigating the circumstances present in a given case on appeal becomes 
more justifiable.  The retroactive application of new constitutional rules in 
more cases would help to rectify this imbalance. 
Such an approach would not be about simply releasing prisoners.  
Rather, the idea would be to force state and federal criminal justice 
institutions to reduce the substantive and procedural errors inherent in the 
administration of criminal justice. 
In particular, the value of fairness should trump economic costs when 
the stakes are highest for the prisoner.  Where the impact on the question of 
innocence or on the sentencing determination is significant, fairness should 
prevail.  The cost of failing to accord prisoners human rights far outweighs 
the economic costs of remedying earlier errors or malfeasance. 
III.  THE VIRTUES OF NORMATIVE RETROACTIVITY 
Having described the normative retroactivity test and demonstrated its 
possible application to the retroactivity question, the Article concludes by 
making the case for its adoption as a substitute for the Teague rule.  The 
central advantages of this approach to retroactivity include: (1) abandoning 
the confusion of the substance-procedure dichotomy of Teague, (2) 
undermining the flawed finality presumption, (3) preserving judicial 
resources, and (4) creating a greater connection between the practical 
application of the retroactivity doctrine and its theoretical underpinnings. 
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A.  Abandoning the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy 
The Teague doctrine, as explained, has created confusion in its 
application.153  Specifically, the substance-procedure dichotomy has proved 
difficult to apply.  At the heart of this confusion is the idea that almost all 
procedural rules have some substantive component.  As a result, it is often 
difficult to determine whether to treat the rule as substantive, on account of 
its substantive component, or as procedural, because at its core it simply 
requires a certain procedure. 
The trouble with the Teague doctrine goes further, however, in that the 
concepts of substance and procedure have no direct connection to the 
concept of retroactivity.  As discussed above, it presumes that substantive 
rules establish rights that deserve retroactive application more than rights 
that arise from new procedural rules.154 
Fundamental fairness does not hinge on whether a rule is substantive or 
procedural; neither does the concept of finality.  A procedural rule may 
have a more significant impact on the question of fairness than a substantive 
one.  Likewise, as seen in the sentencing context, finality often can be far 
more offended by the application of a new substantive rule than a 
procedural rule. 
One benefit, then, of the normative approach to retroactivity is that it 
abandons the substance-procedure dichotomy.  Instead, the normative 
approach focuses, as demonstrated, on the direct effect of the rule.  By using 
the impact- and value-balancing aspects of the normative retroactivity test, 
courts can avoid the confusion of the substance-procedure dichotomy. 
Neither of these tests rely on a determination of substance versus 
procedure.  Instead, these tests eschew such a determination in favor of 
exploring the impact of the new rule, as well as weighing the competing 
interests at stake. 
B.  Undermining the Flawed Finality Presumption 
Under the Teague test, the overall presumption is in favor of prospective 
application.  The Court’s idea, as explained above, is that finality is the most 
important of the applicable values in the retroactivity determination.  
Indeed, the bright-line principle that exists mandates applying new criminal 
constitutional rules prospectively unless the petitioner can demonstrate the 
substantive exception. 
The current flawed state of criminal justice administration demonstrates 
why the Court should abandon this presumption.  The frequency of error 
 
153 See supra, Section I.B.3. 
154 Id. 
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and injustice, both in the high number of innocent offenders with 
convictions and in the imposition of excessive prison sentences, counsel 
against resting the retroactivity decision so heavily on the finality principle.  
Rather, devaluing finality has the consequence of creating the opportunity 
to remedy injustice in a deliberate and proportional way.  Remember that 
retroactive application of rules enables the courts to explore whether an 
injustice has occurred.  It does not necessarily mean that the petitioner will 
receive relief. 
Under the normative retroactivity test, the concept of finality still plays a 
role in the retroactivity determination, but in a more balanced, principled 
way.  The impact test ensures that the concept of finality will not trump 
fundamental fairness and justice at all costs, as it seemingly does in many 
applications of the current Teague rule.  Instead, the balancing test 
incorporates the principle of finality in light of the impact of the 
constitutional rule, allowing its application to bar unnecessary review of 
cases on collateral appeal without preventing courts from remedying 
injustices. 
C.  Preserving Judicial Resources 
Another value of the normative retroactivity test might be the 
preservation of judicial resources.  With a number of new constitutional 
criminal law determinations in recent years, the Supreme Court has often 
needed to decide a second case to determine the retroactivity of the new 
rule.155  When there is confusion concerning whether a new rule applies 
retroactively, the Supreme Court then must make a second determination 
(beyond the initial merits decision) with respect to a particular case.  Given 
that the Court elects to hear less than 100 cases per term, the allocation of 
resources to determine retroactivity is a significant one. 
The more significant use of resources occurs in the lower courts, 
however, where courts litigate the retroactivity issue.  The lack of clarity of 
the Teague standard means that there is often widespread litigation with the 
adoption of a new rule, even in cases where the courts decide that the 
proper application of the new rule is prospective. 
The normative retroactivity test offers more predictability than the 
Teague test does.  While the court will need to litigate the hard cases 
(described above), the normative retroactivity provides clear guidance in 
many cases such that the lower court does not need to engage in lengthy 
analysis.  Further, the applicable indicia—the impact of the case—rests upon 
 
155 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (finding rule prohibiting mandatory 
life sentences for juveniles to be retroactive); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 
1264 (2016) (acknowledging the new rule and deciding if it ought to be retroactive). 
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objective indicia, which will then provide clarity in the framing of the 
retroactivity determination. 
D.  Connecting Theory to Practice 
The best argument, however, for the adoption of the normative 
retroactivity test remains its connection to the core principles that underlie 
the concept of retroactivity as applied to cases on collateral appeal.  Unlike 
the Teague test, the normative retroactivity test utilizes the potential impact 
of the retroactive application and its relationship to the values at stake to 
determine whether a new rule applies retroactively. 
The normative theory understands the retroactivity question as one that 
concerns the practical impact of its application.  Where the new 
constitutional rule has a wide bearing on the likely innocence of offenders 
or the disproportionality of their sentences, the application should be 
retroactive because the potential for unfairness is high.  The value of 
fairness, then, guides the application of the retroactivity principle.  Similarly, 
when the impact is likely to be minimal as to the guilt-innocence or 
sentencing outcomes, the new rule should not apply retroactively.  Here, the 
value of finality relates directly to the minimal nature of the impact of the 
sentence. 
The practical decision—the retroactivity question—thus stems directly 
from the impact of the new rule.  In doing so, the competing principles of 
fairness and finality, embedded in the idea of impact, influence the 
retroactivity decision.  Where the impact is unclear, these theoretical 
principles play a determinative role.  The court must balance these 
competing considerations to assess retroactivity. 
The theory inherent in the idea of retroactivity therefore guides its 
application to new rules of criminal constitutional law.  As such, the 
retroactivity determination does not rely on arbitrary distinctions 
concerning procedure and substance.  Instead the presence (or absence) of 
the reasons to grant (or deny) retroactive application serves to guide its 
application under the normative retroactivity approach. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the Court’s recent decisions in Montgomery and Welch, and the 
question of the application of Hurst to Florida and Alabama death cases, this 
Article has sought to explore the current application of the Teague 
retroactivity doctrine by the Supreme Court.  The Article has first argued for 
the adoption of a different paradigm in light of the confusion inherent in 
the substance-procedure dichotomy that exists at the center of the Teague 
inquiry.  Specifically, the Article has advocated the adoption of a normative 
retroactivity approach, where the impact of the new constitutional rule, as 
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well as the competing underlying values of retroactivity determine the 
application of the new constitutional rule to cases on collateral appeal. 
